Introduction
The 1990s witnessed a heated debate among political theorists regarding the extent to which social justice requires the fair distribution of resources versus the recognition of group differences. 1 While scholars advocating for a politics of recognition never underestimated the need for an equitable distribution of wealth, they pointed out that unjust social hierarchies do not always track socioeconomic ones. Symbolic, cultural, and identitarian dimensions of social value can also produce patterns of exclusion. Reducing social justice to a matter of wealth redistribution, they argued, makes liberal political philosophy insensitive to racial, gendered, cultural, and ableist dimensions of privilege and privation.
Something of the dichotomy between redistribution and recognition is at play in the current debate over explaining support for populist movements and leaders across the West and beyond. While some observers maintain populism draws its energy from long-term post-industrial economic malaise that has been neglected by mainstream parties, 2 others point to anxiety over loss of cultural primacy on the part of formerly dominant groups. success to a general erosion of public commitment to democratic values and procedures. 5 The debate sparked by the British electorate's narrow decision to leave the European Union illustrates the cleavage between identitarian and socioeconomic explanations in particular: while some view the Brexit vote as a flashpoint for anti-immigrant sentiment and, more broadly, as a bid to restore national sovereignty, others describe it as a manifestation of socioeconomic insecurities that establishment parties have failed to address.
Populist movements have also gained ground in such formerly steadfast members of the Union as France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Poland. Many, though not all, of these movements incorporate anti-EU messages into their platforms. What could and should the EU's response be to the rising tide of populist politics? Are there steps the EU could take to allay the concerns that energize these movements? Or are such steps, particularly if they require giving greater powers to EU institutions, likely to add fuel to the fire? Clearly, the answer will depend on which accounts of populism's rise we find most compelling. Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether the EU is equally well-equipped (or ill-equipped) to respond to identitarian grievances as it is to socioeconomic ones.
(i) The European project as a socioeconomic solution to identity politics At its origins, the European integration project was a response to identity politics. Supranational institutions represented an attempt to disarm and sublimate the national rivalries that had riven the continent. (ii) Could a Social Europe dampen the appeal of identity politics?
Clearly, the EU has in significant respects failed to make good on its promise to mitigate the ravages of global casino capitalism, particularly insofar as its institutional configuration favors price stability and fiscal conservatism, emphasizes monetary policy over public spending, and resists attempts to reembed the market in a matrix of social protection.
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The fiscal coordination that allows the EMU to function has steadily tightened, along with the disciplinary apparatus attached to it. Member states are required to coordinate their economic policy cycles and ensure the conformity of their economic priorities, budgetary choices, and structural reforms with strict EU rules. The legislative and constitutional adjustments necessitated by the crisis have corralled member states into a protracted austerity zone, forcing them to pare down public spending, and with it, the social protections they afford their citizens.
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Rather than bolstering the capacity of member states to protect their vulnerable domestic constituencies against the pressures of global economic interdependence, the EU has worked to exacerbate these pressures.
Part of the reason for this is that the EU lacks the fiscal capacity necessary to provide compensatory or redistributive programs of its own. Although the Similarly, while it introduced means for the EU to "encourage cooperation" between member states on social policy, it left it up to member states to design, implement, and fund it.
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Although the EU was subjected to a new general obligation to "take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion," it was not given any new powers with which to carry out this mandate.
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Instead, it was merely enjoined from stepping on member states' toes as they walked a tightrope between the socioeconomic needs of their citizens, on the one hand, and the imperatives of market liberalization, on the other. Since the 1990s, a growing chorus of scholars has expressed concern that the singular emphasis on market integration and competitiveness is eroding the domestic social protections and delicate corporatist bargains that define the European social model.
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In sum, Social Europe has unquestionably made far less headway than Market Europe. it is increasingly difficult for a political community on the scale of nation-state to effectively address the challenges that affect its citizens. Particularly from the viewpoint of economic production and consumption, the world already looks like a cosmopolis.
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The EU's promise today is that it is an institutional attempt, however modest, to catch up with that reality.
And the EU has been remarkably successful at resisting some of the deregulatory or disembedding pressures occasioned by global economic interdependence, even if it hardly gets the credit it deserves in this regard. For instance, it upholds stringent public health and consumer protection standards over the vociferous objections of its trading partners and against WTO rules. As a result, the pendulum that used to swing between the left and right sides of the political spectrum now oscillates precariously between moderate and extreme right. Shifting the EU's priority from market regulation to social justice is politically difficult, but not unimaginable. But social justice is not the same thing as social democracy, and it is gratuitous to assume that, once created, a supranational welfare state would acquire the strong underpinnings of an engaged and invested citizenry. The optimistic expectation of European federalists in the 1990s was that a genuine constitutional re-founding would catalyze a vibrant
European demos and meaningful democratic opinion-and will-formation at the and the UKIP -received the most votes in their respective countries in the EP election, and others -such as the Italian M5S, the Latvian LNNK, and the Polish PiS -secured second place."
He concludes that "these parties were able to move away from the niche positions they have typically held in the electoral market and, thereby, became influential players in the national the EU-28 ranked "the economic situation" and "member state finances" as one of the top two issues facing the EU. 46 For their part, UK respondents were within a few percentage points of the EU-28 average in terms of their priorities.
When asked about the two most important challenges facing the EU, Brits ranked immigration first at 42%, terrorism second at 26%, and economic situation third at 24%. 47 Puzzlingly, however, when EU citizens were asked about the top two challenges facing their own country, economic concerns such as unemployment, housing, pensions, and rising cost of living took center stage. 48 Although immigration was the second most frequently mentioned item across all member states at 26%, the combined share of socioeconomic issues highlighted by respondents is 122%. 49 These survey results suggest that when it comes to their own lives, a majority of EU citizens are most immediately worried about their living standards. As it happens, economic prosperity is also the EU's top priority, given that its core competences relate to trade, competition, market regulation, and price stability.
Puzzlingly, however, citizens associate the EU with a markedly different set of challenges-immigration and terrorism-which raise anxieties about the intrusion of disruptive, alien 'others' into their political communities.
Apparently, Britons and Estonians and Cypriots and Czechs regard the EU less as a sphere of economic opportunity, personal mobility, and geopolitical security, and more as an overcrowded boat floating precariously in terroristinfested waters. It is no wonder, then, that significant constituencies in these countries want to distance themselves from a Union they associate with insecurity.
Of course, how far these distorted optics are due to the EU's own failures of competence and how far they should be attributed to willful distortion by political actors for domestic political advantage remains a matter for debate.
However, the EU itself is hardly in a position to mount an effective response to the misperceptions. The way that European integration has been packaged and sold over generations has encouraged popular estimation of its value solely in terms of euros and cents. Meanwhile, European societies are once more in the grip of the kind of identity politics that decades of carefully constructed economic relationships were supposed to obviate. If the EU is ill-equipped to meet this challenge, it is not so much because of its bias in favor of deregulation, as leftist critics contend, but because the only tools at its disposal for doing so are of an economic nature. For this reason, it is unclear whether an alternative, social democratic model of supranationalism would do much resolve the discontents of identity politics. In fact, since such a project would require vesting the EU with even greater power and fiscal capacity, it is likely to have the opposite effect, at least in the near term. Trying to defuse identity politics with redistributive politics at the supranational level could be like trying to fix an electrical failure with a monkey wrench. The likely outcome is electrocution, not illumination.
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